The Ram in Action and in Accident

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By William Laird Clowes, Fellow of the King's College, London.

I have heard naval officers, of all ranks from the lowest to the highest, and in this theatre as well as elsewhere, express themselves in very sanguine tones concerning the future of the ram in naval warfare. I do not by any means intend to imply that all naval officers appear to believe to the same extent in the efficacy of this weapon. But I have known many, and among them officers of great experience at sea, who by their utterances suggest that, given slight superiority of speed and good handling, one ship can, without much difficulty, be made to ram another, even when the other is under full control and has plenty of sea-room in which to manœuvre. This view of the capabilities of the ram has always, though in a loose and vague kind of way, been widely held; and I venture to think that the number of those who hold it has increased of late, and especially since last June, when the country had to lament the terrible and dramatic fate of the Victoria, and of so many of her gallant officers and men.

It would be undue presumption on my part to evolve, as it were, from my inner consciousness, any opinions and theories as to the employment of the ram, and to put them forward here, before a meeting composed almost entirely of naval officers and practical men, as views worthy of serious consideration. But, recollecting as I do that naval officers and practical men have but little leisure for the study of the past, and that, nevertheless, they all agree that the teachings of the past are of the utmost value to them, I am encouraged to lay before them a number of facts which I have assembled, and, with all deference, to indicate certain conclusions which those facts seem to force upon the mind of a very devoted,and I trust wholly unprejudiced, student of recent, as well as of ancient, naval history. I do not, in a word, ask you to listen to me, but to pay attention to the voice of events, which, though by-gone, have not ceased to be instructive.

The following is a detailed list of 74 cases of attempted ramming in what may be called modern naval warfare. I have included here all the cases, since the outbreak of the American War of Secession, on which I have been able to lay my hand. The list must not, therefore, be regarded as a list of selected examples. No doubt I have omitted some cases, but I have intentionally omitted none.

In the first column I have numbered the cases to facilitate future reference. In the second I have given the date. In the third I have specified whether the scene of the occurrence was in narrow waters (N.) where manœuvring was difficult if not impossible, or in some locality (S.) which afforded a reasonable amount of sea-room. In the fourth column is the name of the would-be rammer. In the fifth is the name of the craft which it was endeavored to ram. In the sixth column I have shown the condition of the would-be rammer after the manœuvre had been executed or had failed. By U., I mean that the ship was, so far as the operation was concerned, uninjured; by Da., that she received slight or moderate damage; by S. Da., that she received serious damage sufficient to greatly impair her immediate fighting powers; by R. A., that she missed her mark and ran ashore; and by S., that she sank in consequence of the collision. In the seventh column I have indicated whether the ship intended to be rammed was at that moment under steam (S.), at anchor (A.), or unmanageable, on account of accident either to her machinery or to her steering gear (Un.). In the eighth and last column I have noted the condition, in consequence of the attempt, of the vessel intended to be rammed; U. signifying uninjured; Da., slight or moderate damage; S. Da., serious damage; Di., disabled; and S., sunk.