Down Report

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The Down Report was a pair of reports by Lieutenant-Commander Richard Thornton Down following a 1917 trip to Washington, D.C.. He and his American hosts exchanged information and observations of how their naval services operated.

With minimal formatting changes to suit the Wiki medium, the contents of what were actually two separate reports follow.

Initial Report of 27 June 1917

Washington. 27th June I9I7.

Sir,

I have the honour to forward the report of my proceedings during the period of my residence in the United States from the 6th of May to the present date. During this time which embraces that in which the British Mission was also in this place I have been employed exclusively in Washington with occasional visits of from three to four days to the American Fleet at their War Bases.

I have been questioned by and have given information before the House of Representatives Naval Committee. I have been throughout in constant touch with all heads of Departments and their Staffs at the Navy Department but more particularly with the Ordnance, Materiel and Gunnery Exercise Sections. I have also been down to the Fleet on three occasions visiting a large number of their latest ships, witnessing two full calibre firing practices besides meeting and conversing with many of their Officers.

I have invariably met with the utmost courtesy and then keenest spirit of co-operation has been apparent on all sides. Everything that I wished to see has been shown me and my criticism of their materiel, methods and organization has been freely invited in the desire to profit by our experience.

In the exchange of information I have dealt principally with the following Officers :-

  • Chief of Bureau of Ordnance and Staff (Ordnance and Materiel)
  • Chief of Bureau of Navigation and Staff (Personnel and Manning Section)
  • Chief of Bureau of Target Practice and Staff
  • Chief of Staff to the Admiral Commanding the U.S. Fleet
  • Fleet Gunnery Officer on the Staff of the Admiral Commanding the U.S. Fleet
  • Gunnery Officer on the Staff of Vice-Admiral Commanding the Battleship Force
  • All Battleship Gunnery Officers
  • Fleet Surgeon and Naval Constructor on the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief

Information Down Provided the U.S.N.

The following is a summary of the points discussed. Many of them have been gone into in considerable detail according to the requirements of the Officers with whom I was dealing and to the extent of my knowledge to satisy their queries. In all cases I endeavoured to make it plain where I was simply expressing my own views or where I believed them to coincide with opinion or practice in our Fleet.

GENERAL

  • Grand Fleet Bases and Composition of Fleet
  • Coaling arrangements and percentage of coal kept on board
  • Routine and Daily Leave
  • Refits and Long Leave
  • Exercises in the Flow and in the Firth of Forth, day & night
  • Exercises in the Pentland Firth
  • Night and day full calibre firing, towing arrangements, targets and so on.
  • Base and exercies of pre-dreadnoughts
  • Allocation of the Flow for practices - system employed
  • Daily drills, etc. at anchor. Spotting Table
  • Full details of all gun and searchlight practices and Torpedo look-out exercises
  • Battle Orders, Cruising formations and General Tactics of the Fleet
  • General scheme of traininh in the Fleet to meet the requirements for new construction, etc.
  • Paravanes and how worked and fitted

ORGANIZATION AND TRAINING

  • Action. Night Action and Night Defence Organization
  • Cruising organization for Night Defence
  • Fire and Repair parties for action and "Scout System", and with equipment of these parties, stores, etc.
  • First Aid men at Fighting Stations
  • Food, water and sanitary arrangements in action and while closed up before action
  • General question of clothing in action and at other times
  • Closing of all doors and ventilation in action
  • Permanently closing all non-essential ventilation and closing as much more as possible on going to sea
  • Necessity to prepare for battle before closing up at Action Stations
  • Scheme of daily training for all skilled ratings, training classes, ordinary seamen and boys, R.N.R's, R.N.V.R's, and men for Armed Merchantmen and new construction

PERSONNEL

  • Average arrangement and numbers of personnel in each capital ship
  • Reduction of Officer personnel due to expansion
  • Substitution of "Officers for War only" for properly trained officers
  • Withdrawal of Officers for Specialist courses, other services, etc.
  • Withdrawal of C.P.O's, P.O.'s and Leading Seamen on promotion
  • Withdrawal of ratings monthly for new construction and other services

FIRE CONTROL

  • General system with description of instruments
  • Standardization of orders for Fire Control
  • Concentration of fire and intercommunication between control positions
  • New spotting rules; full explanation
  • Point of Aim

MATERIEL

  • General arrangement of our turrets, loading, etc.
  • Control instruments and rangefinders
  • Our Director system
  • Evershed's Bearing Installation
  • Usborne's Time of Flight Indicator
  • Dryer's Plotting Table [sic]
  • Aid to Spotter
  • "Rounds Fired" Indicators
  • Secondary Lighting
  • Gas Appliances
  • Extended Range Scales to increase range of guns to greater limits
  • Natures of projectiles and delay action fuzes
  • Small collision mats to plug holes, damaged hatches, etc.
  • Manhole escapes in hatches
  • Air Blast system
  • Magazine protection and reinforcing armour decks
  • Water sprinklers in turrets
  • Protective mattresses, fearnought screens, mantlets, fire-proofing solition and their use in isolating secondary gun positions, etc.

LESSONS OF JUTLAND AND OTHER BATTLES

  • Great difference between Target practice at target and action at an indistinct line of
  • Difficulty in designating targets, Captain to Control Officer and Control Officer to Guns
  • Supreme importance of Director, both elevation and training for main and secondary armament
  • Need of instrument to ensure spotter and Director Layer being on the same target
  • Importance of Time of Flight Indicator
  • Danger of any system of control which places too much reliance on rangefinders and information that is derived from them
  • Importance of keeping a check on expenditure of ammunition and fitting electrical instruments between and Conning Tower to effect this
  • Importance of rapidity of fire and early straddling
  • Use of Torpedo Look-outs and development of good system of reporting
  • Armour piercing shell better than high capacity H.E. shell
  • All water-tight doors to be securely clipped to localize explosion and maintain water tight integrity
  • Secondary battery crews should normally be up at guns, not down below owing to rapidity with which Destroyer attacks develop and danger of opening doors
  • Weakness of magazine protection, both deck and via turret
  • Necessity of plenty of shut off valves in fire main
  • Armouring of all unarmoured trunks and fitting of water tight valves in trunks, shafts, louvres, etc., where feasible
  • Liberal supply of shores, wedges, small collision mats, in various compartments to effect temporary repairs
  • Necessity, for safety, to effect compromise in amount of ready ammunition kept up at guns, particularly secondary armament, and hoists communicating with magazines to be kept closed until actually required
  • Some simple organization necessary to allow M.V's of guns to be shifted in action separately (not collectively) to allow for rounds fired
  • Difficulty of fighting ship from Conning Tower owing to restricted view
  • Importance of making target practice conditions simulate as closely as possible those likely to be met with in a modern action by introduction into the practice of difficulties and interruptions which might be experienced

Inferences and Comparative Insights Down Obtained from U.S.N.

The following is a summary of those points in the mass of general information which I have obtained which it is though might be useful or of interest to our service.

A few of them I am confident are worthy of serious consideration.

Pre-dreadnought ships have not been considered.

TURRETS

As machines and taken as a whole I think our turrets are incomparably better than those of the U.S. Navy.

Protection - In protection - redoubts, barbettes and roof - they are much superior to the majority of our ships, though there is with all this heavy armour one weak spot apparent, even in their latest ships (though to a less extent in these) viz; where the junction of the front and side armour plates of the barbette with the floor plate of the turret forms a broad and very indifferently protected glacis. The roof in all cases considerably thicker than in our contemporary ships and is entirely unpierced, the sights and rangefinder being otherwise mounted and the Officer of the Turret reling solely on periscope look-out. The sont face plate is less weakened by the embrasure for the guns than is the case in most of our ships and it is further reinforced to prevent cracking by a heavy wrought iron backing plate.
Ventilation - Artificial ventilation is provided by fans, air being drawn through holes in the overhanging rear floor plate.
Sights - In all American ships the periscope sights are mounted either through holes in the front side armour (as was done experimentally in Tiger) or under the chase of the gun. The latter is the present approved method and provides food protection for the sights though possibly more liable to spray and radiation interference from a hot gun than when mounted elsewhere. The blast bags on the chase of the gun have been dispensed with where the sights are fitted underneath.
Slides - In the majority of their ships the slides are locked together and are incapable of being separately elevated. This has the obvious disadvantages that an accident to one gun may disable the whole turret and the rate of fire of the turret is that of the slowest loading gun since the loading position is a fixed one.[1] They always fire "double barrel" salvoes[2] and in practice these disadvantages have not been very apparent though they are alive to them now and in the latest ships building have modified the design.
Breech Mechanism - The breech mechanism is virtually hand, though the closing motion is sufficiently assisted by low pressure air off the air blast system to overcome the weight of the block. The block is flangeless and there is no positive acting rebound arrangement fitted. Consequently if the breech does happen to slam to, it results in the burring of the threads. The mechanism works well and quickly but the locking gear, carrier, and indeed all fittings connected with it appear too weak for rough and continuous handling. The difference in size and weight of mechanism cannot fail to strike very forcibly anyone acquainted with our gear.[3]
Locks and Tubes - The lock appears simple and efficient. It is combined electric and percussion as are all their tubes.
Recoil and I and O - The recoil arrangements are similar to ours, the guns being run out by springs and controlled by a ram as in our handworked mountings, They say they have experienced little trouble with this system.
Elevating and Training - The elervating and training control is on the Williams-Jenny system. It seems to be about equal, but is certainly not superior to our control. It has the disadvantage, particularly when training over large arcs, that the wheel must be continuously operated to keep the turret in motion and that the rapidity of motion depends on that with which the wheel is turned, which implies considerable physical exertion. The delicacy of control is about equal to that in our own system.[4]
Air Blast - The system is separate from the torpedo charging installation and is a low pressure one, the capacity of the pumps being 400 lbs. per square inch. They deliver into a ring main from which leads are taken off to all turrets and secondary battery guns, reducers being fitted to lower the pressure to 100 lbs. per square inch. The pipe is a larger one than we use and delivers by means of an automatically operated valve into the gun through four orifices. They seem satisfied that the big voilume of air used fulfills the same purpose as the high pressure we go in for with the advanqtage that a break in any one pipe will not endanger the whole system as it would do in ours. They seem much astonished at the high pressure we use.
Loading - The loading arrangements even in their latest ships are primitive in the extreme and though to all appearances everything works quickly and without hitch it is through good drill alone and not through any attempt to utilize modern scientific methods and machinery. All projectiles are stowed on their bases in a kind of hanging chamber under the gunwell corresponding to but at a rather lower level than our working chamber. From this position they are drawn on their bases along the deck by he,p parbuckles, operated by motors, into a vertical hoist which takes them up to the fixed loading position. Here they are tipped horizontal and rolled by hand in front of the chain rammer. In the tree gun turrets there is a separate projectile joist for each gun. It is obviously fairly easy work when dealing with the front row or so of the projectiles, but farther back the parbucking is likely to prove a more difficult business particularly in bad weather. The charges come up by dredger hoists (quarter charge) to compartments below and outside the guns on a level with the bottom of the gunwell which is deep. From here they are man-handled entirely being lifted or passed in three or four stages to the loading tray and pushed by hand into the gun. For the 14" 45 calibre gun each quarter charge weighs 96 lbs; ant it struck me as little less than marvellous how good drill in handling this ammunition made up for defects in appliances. I much doubt if the rate of loading could be maintained in a prolonged action. In the three gun turrets the wing guns have to supply cordite to the centre gun - another defect. The alternative loading arrangements are also poor. The general provision of safety arrangements for magazines had been a matter of long standing and the supply of water and sprinklers is plentiful. The flash tight doors are too flimsy and not sufficiently automatic or positive in operation but this defects are being remedied.

PERISCOPES Periscope sights are used exclusively for all guns and more reliance is placed in periscopes for general observation purposes than we do. The quality seems to be much the same as our own. Coloured glass shades are fitted and can be brough into use by a milled head which is a better arrangement than supplying detachable shades.[5]

DIRECTOR The Director has not been developed to anything like the same extent as with us and until quite recently its importance had not really been full realized. They have no Director training and the laying arrangements are crude and imperfect. It consists of a fixed periscope sight in the armoured spotting tower and in the control turrets, in no ways connected with the guns. In can be trained and elevated but is normally used as a fixed sight, the guns being layed to a certain elevation through the T.S. and fired by the Director Layer when the ship rolls his sights on. The instrument can be adjusted to mean the roll in case the ship is not upright but ranges are not set on it.

Bibliography

  • "Report of Proceedings by Commander Richard T. Down, R.N. during visit to Washington -- 6th May to 27th June" dated 5 July 1917 at The National Archives. ADM 137/1621.

See Also

  1. i.e., the guns within a turret were elevated as a unit, and not individually. Also, loading occurred at a fixed elevation angle.
  2. i.e., all guns in a turret fired simultaneously.
  3. It is not obvious to my eye whether this last sentence means U.S.N. gear was more or less massive than R.N. gear.
  4. i.e., American turrets trained as you rotated a wheel. British turrets rate of training was governed by the position of a wheel or lever swung left or right over a limited range.
  5. The British tended to have tinted shade collars or caps for optics in a separate wooden box.