Loss of H.M.S. Victoria

On June 22nd, 1893, the Mediterranean fleet lay off Beirut. The Commander-in-Chief,' Vice-Admiral Sir George Tryon, K.C.B., flew his flag in the battleship Victoria; the second in command, Rear-Admiral Albert Hastings Markham, flew his in the battleship Camperdown, his proper flagship, the Trafalgar, being under repair at Malta.

At 10 A.M. the fleet weighed and left for Tripoli, another Syrian port. Soon after 2 P.M. Tryon sent for Staff-Commander Thomas Hawkins Smith, who, when he entered the Vice-Admiral's cabin, found Captain the Hon. Maurice Archibald Bourke, of the flagship, already there. Tryon said that, in order to bring the fleet into suitable formation for anchoring as he intended, he would form it into two divisions in line ahead, and that, when it should be far enough past the line of bearings for anchoring, he would invert the course of the columns by turning inwards 16 points, leaders together, the rest in succession. He also said that the distance between the columns prior to the inception of this manœuvre should be six cables (1200 yards). It was remarked that, in such a case, the minimum distance between the columns should be eight cables (1600 yards) ; whereupon the Vice-Admiral said: "Yes : it shall be eight cables." Soon afterwards, however, signals were made in the usual manner for the fleet to form columns of divisions in line ahead, the columns to be disposed abeam to port, and to be six cables apart. The Staff-Commander, noticing that the distance was six cables, went to the Flag-Lieutenant, Lord Gillford, and asked him whether there was not a mistake; and, being shown the order for six cables in Tryon's handwriting, he asked Lord Gillford to make sure before hauling the signal down. The Flag-Lieutenant went to the Vice-Admiral, but was told: "Keep the six cables up."

At 3.27 P.M. the signal to invert the columns by altering course 16 points inwards was hoisted. At that time the fleet was steaming east by north in two columns, the starboard (1st division) or right hand one of which was led by the Victoria, and the port (2nd division), or left hand one, by the Camperdown, those ships being abreast of one another and 1200 yards asunder. The speed was 8.8 knots. The signals hoisted on Tryon's orders were;

-

SECOND DIVISION	FIRST DIVISION
16 POINTS TO STARBOARD	16 POINTS TO PORT
IN SUCCESSION	IN SUCCESSION
PRESERVING THE ORDER OF THE FLEET.	PRESERVING THE ORDER OF THE FLEET.

There was nothing in the signals about leaders turning together. The moment for the leaders to begin the evolution in such a case is indicated by the hauling down of the signals. But before the signals can be hauled down they have to be repeated by the other ships and acknowledged. Acknowledgment by the leader of the second division (the Camperdown) was on this occasion delayed, owing, as was stated subsequently, to the fact that Rear-Admiral Markham suspected that there must be some mistake, and ordered his Flag-Lieutenant to make an enquiry on the subject by semaphore. Before the semaphore signal was made, the Commander-in-Chief signalled to ask what the Rear-Admiral was waiting for; Markham, then jumping to the conclusion that something other than what he had at first imagined must be intended, and placing, as he stated afterwards, implicit confidence in Tryon, ordered the signal to be acknowledged in the ordinary way. That acknowledgment, of course, meant that the signal was comprehended, and that it could and would be acted upon when the proper moment should arrive. An instant later, at 3.31 P.M., the Victoria's two signals were hauled down simultaneously. This indicated that the execution of the two manoeuvres was to begin at once, and simultaneously. Accordingly, the helms of the two flagships were put over, and the great vessels began to turn inwards, and towards one another. Tryon stood on the top of the Victoria's chart-house, and watched.

Staff-Commander Smith, who was by his chief's side then and until the end, says: "As the two ships (Victoria and Camperdown) neared one another, the port engine of the Victoria was reversed, and, when about 10 points round, both engines were put "full speed astern," these directions being given by the Commander-in-Chief. The two ships rapidly neared one another, and the Victoria, being turned in a smaller circle than the Camperdown, was slightly in advance of the latter, so that the stem of the Camperdown struck the Victoria on the starboard bow, about ten feet abaft the anchor,, at about 3.34 P.M. the angle between the lines of keel of the two ships being about .six points, or 68. " When the collision appeared to be inevitable, the order was given to close watertight doors ; and, as the two ships struck, the order was given, ' out collision-mat.' " The Camperdown backed astern ; and exertions were made to get the collisionmat over the hole ; but the ship settled so quickly by the head that this could not be VOL. VII. 2 E 418 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE ROYAL NAVY, 1857-1900. done. In the meantime (the Captain having left the top of the chart-house by order of the Commander-in-Chief to see about the water-tight doors) it was thought that the ship, being struck so far forward, would keep afloat for a considerable time ; and, being then in deep water (70 to 80 fathoms), it was considered desirable to steer for shallow water the nearest part of the 5-fathom line bearing about south, distant 4i miles. The ship's head was turned in that direction, by going astern with the port engine, and ahead with the starboard, so as to clear the Nile, 1 the helm being still hard a-starboard. As soon as the ship's head was pointed clear of the Nile, both engines were put ahead, 2 and the revolution telegraph put to 38 revolutions, or 7 knots." The collision-mat could not be got over the hole. Tryon, therefore, had to content himself with ordering all the apertures on the low-lying forward deck to be closed ; and men were busily engaged upon that work until, the water rising to their waists, they had to be called in. In the interval the Victoria's bows sank steadily deeper and deeper, while the ship took a list to starboard. " At this time (immediately after the engines had been put ' ahead '), the Commander- in-Chief remarked to the Staff-Commander, ' I think she is going.' The latter replied, ' Yes, sir ; I think she is.' The Commander-in-Chief then ordered the signal to be made ' send boats '

3 and, turning round to give these orders to the signalmen, who were on the fore-bridge, abaft the funnels, he saw one of the Midshipmen standing near the standard compass, and said to him, 'Don't stop there, youngster : go to a boat.' These were probably his last words, for, a few moments after this, the ship gave a heavy lurch to starboard, and then turned over almost instantaneously . . ." Staff-Commander Smith went down with Tryon, but was subsequently saved. His watch had stopped at 3h. 44m. 30s. ; so that, in all probability, not more than about ten minutes elapsed between the moment of the collision and that of the Victoria's disappearance. During that time, both Smith and Lord Gillford heard the Commander- in-Chief say, " It is entirely my fault." Tryon met his fate calmly and bravely, and, after the ship turned over, was never seen again. A court-martial to try the surviving officers and men of the Victoria assembled in the Hibernia, at Malta, on July 17th, and sat until July '27th, Admiral Sir Michael Culme-Seymour presiding, and Captain Alfred Leigh Winsloe acting as prosecutor. Owing to the peculiarities of naval court-martial procedure, Bear-Admiral 1 The second ship of the first division, commanded by Capt. Gerard Henry Uctred Noel. The second ship of the second division was the Edinburgh, Capt. John William Brackenbury. 2 The wisdom of this is questionable, looking to the damaged state of the ship's bows, unless, indeed, the Victoria could not go astern. 8 Several ships had previously begun to get out their boats, but Tryon had forbidden the immediate sending of them, probably fearing lest the sinking of the flagship, while boats were close alongside, would add to the extent of the disaster. 1893.] LOSS OF THE " VICTORIA." 419 Markham, and his Flag-Captain, Charles Johnstone, of the Camperdown, though really on their trial indirectly, enjoyed none of the privileges which are allowed to nominal prisoners. Markham, however, was present, and was permitted to suggest questions which, by consent of the court, were then put to witnesses. The essential part of the finding was as follows : "... the loss of her Majesty's ship Victoria, off Tripoli, on the coast of Syria, on ihe 22nd day of June, 1893, was caused by a collision with her Majesty's ship Camperdown : and it is with the deepest sorrow and regret that the Court further finds that this collision was due to an order given by the then Commander-in-Chief, the late Vice-Admiral Sir George Tryon, to the two divisions in which the fleet was formed to turn sixteen points inwards, leaders first, the others in succession, the columns at that time being only six cables apart. " Secondly : that after the collision had occurred, everything that was possible was done on board her Majesty's ship Victoria, and in the squadron generally, both to save life and to save the Victoria ; and the Court is of opinion that the order given by the late Yice-Admiral Sir George Tryon to 'annul sending boats, but to hold them in readiness,' was, under the circumstances, a wise one. " Thirdly : the Court finds that no blame is attributable to Captain the Hon. Maurice Archibald Bourke, or to any other of the surviving officers and ship's company of her Majesty's ship Victoria, for the loss of that ship, and doth therefoie acquit them accordingly. The Court desires to record its opinion that the discipline and order maintained on board the Victoria to the last by everyone was in the highest degree creditable to all concerned. " Fourthly : the Court feels strongly that although it is much to be regretted that Rear-Admiral Albert Hastings Markham did not carry out his first intention of semaphoring to the Commander-in-Chief his doubt as to the signal, it would be fatal to the best interests of the service to say he was to blame for carrying out the directions of his Commander-in-Chief present in person." Some time afterwards, viz., on October 28th, the Admiralty adopted the rather unusual course of reviewing the proceedings and finding in a Minute, which contained the following paragraph : " Their Lordships concur in the feeling expressed by the Court that it is much to be regretted that Rear-Admiral A. H. Markham did not carry out his first intention of semaphoring to the Commander-in-Chief his doubts as to the signal ; but they deem it necessary to point out that the Rear-Admiral's belief that the Commander-in-Chief would circle round him was not justified by the proper interpretation of the signal. The evidence shows that it was owing to this misconception that the precautions, which mistrust of the order given by the Commander-in-Chief should have prompted, were not at once taken by the Rear-Admiral, and that he did not order Captain ..Johnstone to reverse the starboard screw, and to close the watertight doors, until after the ships had turned eight points inwards and were end on." ' Before the making of any comments on this most terrible disaster, the rendering of a tribute to the magnificent behaviour of the Victoria's people in their time of peril must be attended to ; 1 Parl. Paper (1893), including Procs. of C.M., Admlty. Min., and Report of Dir. ..of Nav. Constr. 2 E 2 420 MILITARY HISTORY OF THE ROYAL NAVY, 1857-1900. for those who survived and those who died behaved equally gloriously. Captain Bourke, in his evidence, said : " There was absolutely no panic, no shouting, no rushing aimlessly about. The officers went quietly to their stations, and everything was prepared, and the men were all in their positions, for hoisting out boats or performing any duty that may have been ordered. . . . The men on the forecastle worked with a will until the water was up to their waists ; and it was only when they were ordered aft that they left their work to fall in on the upper deck. ... In the case of the men working below, I was a witness to their coolness. When the order was passed down for everyone to go on deck, there was no haste or hurry to desert the flat. I can further testify to the men below in the engine-room. In the starboard one, all were in their stations : the engineer officer was there, the artificer, and the stokers. I am sure that those in the port engine-room and the boiler-rooms were equally true to themselves. ... In all the details of'this terrible accident one spot especially stands out, and that is the heroic conduct of those who, to the end, remained below, stolidly yet boldly, at their place of duty. All honour to them especially. The men fallen in on the upper deck also showed the same spirit. . . . When the men were turned about to face the ship's side, it must have passed through the minds of many that to ' look out for one's self ' would be the best thing to do. ... This order to turn about was given apparently about a minute before the end ; and I can hear of not one single instance of any man rushing to the side. . . . Not one was found who had not that control over himself which characterises true discipline and order. It has been shown in evidence that no one jumped from the ship until just as she gave the lurch which ended in her capsizing." It was all magnificent. Only typical of the general spirit was the attitude of the Victoria's much-lamented chaplain, the Eev. Samuel Sheppard Oakley Morris, who stood with the ship's company, and, at the last fearful moment, said coolly and bravely, " Steady, men, steady ! " The Camperdoion, it should be added, was herself badly damaged, and was at one time thought to be sinking. Happily, she reached port without serious difficulty. 1 " The court-martial," says FitzGerald, " did not clear up the point which from the first presented itself as an enigma to the minds of all those who knew Sir George Tryon." Vice-Admiral Fitz- Gerald defines that point as being the question, by what mental powers did Sir George arrive " at the conclusion that six cables apart was a safe distance at which two columns of battleships could be turned inwards, or towards one another? " I had the honour of knowing Sir George Tryon, and I must admit that the point, or rather the points, on which light seems to be desirable do not occur to me in that shape at all. I cannot believe that, if Tryon intended to order the manoeuvre which the court-martial supposed him to 1 FitzGerald: 'Life of V.-Adm. Sir Geo. Tryon': Naval Annual, 1894: Desps. ; and Parl. Paper. 1893.] LOSS OF THE " VICTORIA? 421 have ordered, he ever did " arrive at the conclusion " that he could attempt it safely with only six cables' distance between the columns. And since he did undoubtedly order and countenance the attempting of some manoeuvre when only six cables intervened between the columns, I am inclined to suspect that the manoeuvre, as attempted to be carried out, was not the manoeuvre which Tryon intended to be performed. Vice-Admiral FitzGerald himself admits that it cannot be assumed that Tryon purposed to run a risk. Everything that is known of Sir George contradicts that assumption in the most uncompromising manner. Nor can it be supposed that Sir George suddenly went mad. On the other hand, it is on record, not only that Tryon delighted in ordering unexpected and novel manoeuvres, which occasionally seemed dangerous until they were actually put into execution, but also that those of his Captains who knew his methods well were accustomed, when there were two or more ways of accomplishing a thing, to anticipate that the Commander-in-Chief would not choose the most obvious or prosaic way. They were prepared for originality and brilliancy, but they could not admit the possibility that Tryon would expose his ships to needless danger. 1 Now, what was Tryon's object in inverting his columns ? It was to bring the fleet into position for anchoring off Tripoli, where the ships were to take up their billets in columns of divisions, with a distance of two cables between the ships in column, and a similar distance between the columns themselves. Intimation of this had been made by signal earlier in the afternoon. Tryon, Markham, and every Captain in the fleet knew perfectly well that the average tactical diameter of the ships concerned was nearly four cables, or 800 yards 2

in other words, that the basic

diameter of the parabola made by any one of the turning ships must be estimated, for practical purposes, at 800 yards. This being so, the heads of the two columns, being but 1200 yards apart, could not turn simultaneously 16 points inwards could not countermarch inwards without cutting one another's courses at some point. If the two ships turned at exactly the same moment, at equal speeds, and on similar parabolas, they would collide. But, even if 1 FitzGerald ; 368, 387-390. 2 The tactical diameter of the Victoria herself was only 600 yards; but that of some ships was much more. The accepted tactical diameter for the squadron was 800 yards (4 cables) (FitzGerald, 392). 422 MILITARY HISTOHY OF THE ROYAL NAVY, 1857-1900. the distance between the columns had been, as it was suggested it should be, eight cables, or 1600 yards, instead of 1200 yards there would still have been risk of ultimate collision, had the manoeuvre been carried out on the lines on which it was attempted ; for the ships, upon completing the turn, would have been, if not actually on board of one another, at least so close alongside one another as to be in dangerous proximity. We know that Tryon, after having originally suggested six cables, assented to the distance between the columns being eight cables, and that finally, nevertheless, he ordered the distance to be six cables, in spite of the fact that his attention was called pointedly to the discrepancy. We know, moreover, that eight cables was almost as dangerous a distance as six cables, if the columns were to countermarch according to the supposed plan. We know, too, that Tryon intended the columns to come up to the assigned anchorage at a distance of two cables asunder ; so that the most suitable distance apart of the columns previous to the fatal manoeuvre (assuming what was attempted to have been what was intended by the Vice-Admiral) would have been not even eight cables, but ten (2000 yards). There is, I think, but one conclusion to be drawn from all this ; namely, that Tryon knew that, for the purposes of the manoeuvre which he had in his mind not necessarily the manoeuvre which was attempted it did not greatly matter whether the initial distance between the columns was six cables or eight cables. If it had greatly mattered, Tryon was the last man in the world to have been careless on the subject, or to have run things too fine. 1 This conclusion seems to clear the way somewhat ; but before I go on to point out what it appears to me to clear the way to, I desire to dwell upon another admitted fact, a fact, however, which has been strangely lost sight of. The terms of the flag-signal to each division terminated with the direction, "preserving the order of the fleet." Either that direction meant literally and plainly that the order of the fleet in every respect was to be preserved, or it was a direction which, in the circumstances, demanded further elucidation. Tryon did not further elucidate it ; wherefore it may be inferred that it was to be accepted literally. 1 The arguments about to be put forth were first advanced by the Author iu a letter to the Times soon after the catastrophe. He is not aware that they have ever been adequately discussed, though they were cited long afterwards by the Saturday Review. 1893.] LOSS OF THE " VICTORIA." 423 What, then, was the order of the fleet? It was a disposition in columns of divisions in line ahead, the columns disposed abeam to port, with a distance of six cables between the columns. At the head of the first or starboard divisional column was the Victoria, followed by the Nile, etc. : at the head of the port or second divisional column was the Camperdown, followed by the Edinbiirgh, etc. The direction " preserving the order of the fleet " may I believe, must have been intended by Tryon to mean that, after the completion of the manoeuvre, the Victoria was still to head the starboard, and the Camperdown still to head the port column, and that the ships following each of the leaders were to follow in the same sequence and manner as before the inception of the manoeuvre. It is difficult to perceive what other meaning can be attached to it, in view of the nature of the signals of which it formed part.